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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is founded in this court pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-14 and 16 (1987) (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 (8) 
(2003), Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (2001), and Rule 14(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This matter involves a final agency decision of the Utah Labor Commission 
Appeals Board. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
There are essentially two issues for resolution on appeal. 
A. Issues on appeal. 
1. Did Alexander's accident arise out of his County employment while he was 
transporting his wife to her place of employment? 
2. Was Alexander involved in a compensable industrial accident the time of his 
automobile accident or did he fall within the coming-and-going rule precluding his recovery? 
B. Applicable Standard of Review. 
In reviewing these issues under UAPA, this Court must determine if the County was 
substantially prejudiced by the agency's decision, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4) (1997), 
and that the error was not harmless. Alta Pacific Associates. Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 
931 P.2d 103, 116 (UT 1997). Where the agency has not been granted discretion in 
interpreting statutory language, this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, giving no 
deference to the agency's ruling. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(d); King v. Industrial 
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Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281.1286(UTApp. 1993). When reviewing the legal effect of specific 
facts, the court gives no deference to the lower court's ruling. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 
939 P.2d 177, 181 (UT 1997). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed for 
reasonableness and rationality. Acosta v. Labor Comm'n. 2002 UT App. 67, 44 P.3d 819 
cert, denied 48 P3d 979 (UT 2002). 
C. Preservation of issues. 
The issues presented for appeal were preserved in the Answer to the Application for 
Hearing (R. 10) and in the Motion for Review filed by Salt Lake County (R. 92-108). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code. Ann. § 34A-2-101 et seq., governs 
compensation for industrially-related injuries. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 
(1999), provides: 
(1) An employee...who is injured...by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or 
death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines... 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines...provided under this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee 
An employee's injuries incurred while commuting to and from work are generally 
considered not to arise "out of and in the course of the employee's employment." Soldier 
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Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey. 709 P.2d 1165,1166 (UT 1985). Compensability depends upon 
which party-the employee or the employer-received the predominant benefit from the travel. 
VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n. 901 P.2d 281,284 (Utah App. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On February 22, 2005, the administrative law judge entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order that Alexander suffered an "accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment." (R. at 88). The ALJ ruled that Alexander at the time of the 
accident was providing a substantial benefit to the County when he was both on and off duty 
by his operation of his vehicle, and that the County "had substantial control" over 
Alexander's operation of that vehicle. (Id.). As a result, the ALJ ordered the County to pay 
the statutory benefits. 
The County timely filed a Motion for Review on March 21, 2005 (Tr. 92-108). 
On February 13, 2006, the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board, in a two-to-one 
decision, issued its Order Denying Review. (R. at 174-179). It concluded that the County 
"received the predominate benefit from his (Alexander's) travel" and that the injury was 
compensable. (Id. at 176). The dissent found that Alexander received the predominate 
benefit of the travel in which he was engaged at the time of the accident and that he did not 
suffer an industrial injury. (Id. at 177). 
On November 7, 2001, Steven A. Alexander was employed with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs Office (Application, R. 1; Tr. 181 at 25). His office was located at 3365 
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South 900 West in South Salt Lake City (Tr. 181 at 24,72,74), and he would work from 8:00 
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Tr. 181 at 59) in an administrative capacity. (Tr. 181 at 58-59). The 
County paid him based on the number of hours worked. (Tr. 181 at 59-61). He usually 
worked forty hours each week. (Tr. 181 at 26). Work in excess of forty hours had to be 
preauthorized and was paid at an over time rate of time-and-one-half. (Tr. 181 Id. at 59). 
If he worked less than forty hours in a given week, the missing hours were deducted from his 
paycheck. (Tr. 181 at 59-61; County Policy 2-5-03.03, R. at 34-35). 
On the day of the accident, he was driving a County-owned Ford Explorer. (Tr. 181 
at 28). He was dressed in civilian clothing at that time. (Tr. 181 at 72). The Explorer was 
not marked as a police vehicle (Tr. 181 at 61), and it was not bearing "EX" plates identifying 
it as a government vehicle. (Tr. 181 at 62). The Explorer carried no external markings 
identifying it as a Sheriffs Office vehicle. (Tr. 181 at 61-62). The accident occurred at 
approximately 7:45 a.m. (Tr. 181 at 74) and at approximately 1-15 and 12300 South in Salt 
Lake County. (Tr. 181 at 28). Earlier that morning, Alexander had left his residence at 4165 
South 2700 West in West Valley City (Tr. 181 at 24) and he had been helping his wife 
perform her job duties because she had lost fifty percent of her vision in at least one eye and 
could not drive. (Tr. 181 at 28-29). He had taken her to approximately 1-15 and the 
Bangerter Highway for her completion of some her duties on behalf of her employer, NAC. 
(Tr. 181 at 29). At the time of the automobile accident, he was taking her to her employer's 
main office at 3rd West and 5th South in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 181 at 35, 72-73). He intended 
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to drop her off at her work and then report to his office. (Tr. 181 at 35). At the time of the 
accident, he had approximately fifteen minutes to drive twenty-two miles from the accident 
site to his wife's work in downtown Salt Lake City, and then to double-back to South Salt 
Lake to report for work at his office. (Tr. 181 at 35). 
At the time of the accident, Alexander understood that Sheriffs Office policy 
excluded travel to and from the office as compensable or as time worked. (County Policy 
2-5-03.03(l)(4), R. at 35; Tr. 181 at 68). The policy required Alexander to monitor radio 
traffic, but he could only officially respond if "in the vicinity of an in progress crime or other 
emergency" (Policy 2-8-02.04(6) (R. at 38)), and he was precluded from responding while 
transporting non-peace officer passengers. (Id.). 
Alexander understood that the Sheriffs Office policy did not compensate for travel 
time and that off-duty deputies who responded to an in-progress event could "then become 
on duty "and be compensated. (Tr. 181 at 71-72). 
At the time and place of the accident, Alexander's vehicle was equipped with internal 
emergency lights, but they had not been activated prior to the collision. (Tr. 181 at 64). 
Alexander only contacted dispatch after the accident had occurred and his wife had suffered 
serious injuries. (Tr. 181 at 30-32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the time of this accident, Alexander was northbound on 1-15 at approximately 
12300 South in Salt Lake County at approximately 7:45 a.m. in the middle of rush-hour 
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traffic. He was in an unmarked car, wearing civilian clothes, and helping his wife perform 
her duties as an employee of NAC. They were engaged in personal chores in an unmarked 
vehicle and they were no different from the thousands of commuters enduring Salt Lake 
County rush-hour traffic in their drive to work. Alexander was not on duty or about to be. 
He was on a personal errand for his wife and himself-taking her to her job sites in the County 
and then transporting her to her office for work. While engaged in this personal errand, he 
effectively had removed himself and his vehicle and equipment from performing Sheriffs 
Office work. He was in rush-hour traffic at the sound end of the County and could not have 
shown up for work on time at his South Salt Lake office. Becaiuse his wife 's vision was so 
impaired that she could not drive and she was sitting next to him, he could not have 
responded to any police emergency or in-progress crime for at least two reasons. Sheriffs 
Office policy prohibited his responding with a civilian passenger. Second, he could not and 
would not have dropped off his visually-impaired wife at the side of the freeway or on some 
arterial street while he pursued Sheriffs Office business. The only connection with the 
Sheriffs Office that Alexander had at the time of the accident was that he was occupying a 
Sheriffs Office vehicle. 
The Commission extended coverage to Alexander even though at the time of his 
injury he was dressed as a civilian, he was driving a vehicle outwardly no different from the 
thousands of commuters on the freeway with him, he was not engaged in any Sheriffs Office 
police work, he was helping his wife in performing her work assignments, he was not on-
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duty at his office, he was not being paid, and he was transporting a civilian passenger whose 
presence prohibited him from responding to any police emergency. The Commission has 
carved out a new exception to the "coming-and-going rule," in effect ruling that police 
officers' injuries arising from automobile accidents involving an agency vehicle are sustained 
"in an accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment." l The 
Commission's ruling ignores the long line of cases from Utah courts recognizing and 
applying the coming-and-going rule precluding worker's compensation benefits for 
employees traveling to and from their employment. The Commission's ruling presents 
serious liability exposure for any employer who allows any employee to operate a work 
vehicle, no matter on how limited a basis, on personal errands as long as the employee 
monitors the radio (or listens for the cell phone's ring) or carries work equipment or keeps 
a utility uniform on board, even, for example, when transporting his child and team mates 
to a game, and regardless of the employee's testimony that he was not engaged in work-
related activity at the time of injury. 
The Commission's misapplication of the "coming-and-going" rule of law should be 
reversed for a number of reasons. No where in the Worker's Compensation Act has the 
legislature carved out such an exception to the "coming-and-going" rule. No Utah appellate 
*See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission of Utah. Court of Appeals Case No. 
0005-0774CA, in which the Commission extended benefits to a Salt Lake City police officer 
involved in an accident with an agency vehicle near Tooele County while she was off duty, 
transporting herself and her infant son to their residence in Tooele, and not engaged in police 
work. 
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case has recognized such an exception either. Utah has not atbandoned the "coming-and-
going" rule. If a "police vehicle" exception is to be recognized, it must come from 
legislation, not from the Commission's actions. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Facts Supporting the Commission's Ruling. 
The Appeal Board's findings supporting its decision are set forth pursuant to Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9). Alexander was a lieutenant with the County Sheriffs Office. (Tr. 181 at 
25-26, 58). He had, on other occasions, responded to calls when he was off duty and had 
issued citations. (Tr. 181 at 34). He was on call day and night, seven days a week, for the 
investigation of homicides and major crimes. (Tr. 181 at 27). Under County policy, 
vehicles were issued to officers "for use in the performance of their duties." (Policy 2-8-
01.00(1), R. 36). Limited personal use of the vehicles was allowed. (Policy 2-8-02.04(6), 
R. 37; Tr. 181 at 35, 70-71). The County provided for the fuel and maintenance for the 
vehicle. (Policy 2-8-02.02, R. at36;Tr. 181 at 71,75). Alexander was monitoring the police 
radio. (Policy 2-8-02.04(6), R. at 38). Alexander's vehicle was carrying a Ml6 rifle, 
shotgun, and Sheriffs Office jacket. (Tr. 181 at 31, 33-34). His presence provided a "cop 
on a street." (Tr. 181at 34-35). The County controlled Alexander's use of the vehicle by 
requiring him to monitor the radio (Policy 2-8-02.04(6), R. at 38); wash the vehicle (Policy 
2-8-02.03, R. at 36; 175); and carry firearms, police identification, citation book, flares, and 
a (utility) uniform. (Policy 2-8-02.04(4), R. at 37). He could not operate the vehicle outside 
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of the County without authorization (Policy 2-8-02.04(2), R. at 37); drive the vehicle if the 
occupants had consumed alcohol; transport alcohol except in connection with police 
matters; or engage the vehicle in activities manifestly inconsistent with the obligation to 
respond to an emergency; or allow non-Sheriffs personnel to operate the vehicle. (Id.). The 
policy directed that officers not dress in such a way as to discredit the agency (restricting the 
wearing of tank tops, reversed baseball caps, earrings, day old beards). (Id.). The vehicle 
had no external police markings, but was fully equipped as a police car with siren, radio, and 
internal police lights. (Tr. 181 at 61-62,63,64,65,66-67; Exhibits 2-11, photographs, R. at 
33). The County benefitted from the increase of the officers on the streets, faster response 
times, and increased police availability. (Appellant cannot locate evidence in the record for 
this finding at R. at 175). There were circumstances when the County would have benefitted 
from having an unmarked car on the road. (Appellant cannot locate evidence in the record 
on this point at R. at 175). 
B. Discussion. 
POINT I. ALEXANDER'S ACCIDENT DID NOT "ARISE OUT AND IN 
THE COURSE OF" HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
BUT WHILE HE WAS ENGAGED IN PERSONAL ERRANDS WITH HIS 
WIFE. 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-401(1999), extends compensation when an employee's 
injuries occur "... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment..." While the law is liberal in extending employees benefits under the Worker's 
Compensation Act, the statute's two-pronged test requires that the employee demonstrate a 
sufficient nexus between the conduct that produced the claimed injury and employment. 
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Alexander must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that his injuries "occurred in 
the course o f his employment and that the injuries "arose out o f that employment. Walls 
v. Industrial Comm'n. 857 P.2d 964,967 (UT App. 1993) (citations and quotations omitted). 
This court recognized that the term "in the course o f refers to the time, place, and 
circumstances under which an injury occurred, as fleshed out by the Supreme Court in M&K 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 189 P.2d 132, 134 (UT 1948): 
[T]he requirement that the accident arise in the course of the employment 
is satisfied if it occurs while the employee is rendering service to his 
employer which he was hired to do or doing something incidental 
thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render 
such service. 
Walls, supra at 967 (citations omitted). This court further concluded: 
Thus, an injury occurs "in the course o f employment when it takes place 
(1) within the period of employment, (2) at a place where the employee 
reasonably maybe in the performance of her duties, and (3) while she is 
fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 
82 AmJur.2d Workers' Compensation $ 266 (1992): see also 1 Arthur 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 14.00 (1993) ("The course of 
employment requirement... demands that the injury be shown to have 
arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in 
the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment.")... 
Walls, supra, (emphasis in original). 
An employee's claim must satisfy all three criteria when seeking compensation. (Id. 
at 967-968). In Walls, this court rejected the employee's claim of compensable injury when 
she attempted to replace an empty keg after her shift had ended and she had remained at the 
bar to socialize, because she did not meet the three criteria to trigger coverage, even though 
the injury occurred at the place of her employment and involved an activity she generally 
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performed as an employee. The court found determinative that she was not on shift, she had 
remained on the premises to socialize, and her predominate motivation and purpose for her 
activities was social. (Id. at 968-967). Similarly, Alexander cannot meet any of the three 
criteria. He had not reported for duty. (Tr. 181 at 24, 59, 72, 74). He was not at his duty 
station, nor could he have been as scheduled. (Id.). And, his activities and main motivation 
for being on the freeway at the place and time of his accident were to complete personal 
errands for his wife, not for the Sheriffs Office. His injuries did not occur "in the course o f 
his work. 
The requirement that an injury "arises out of," mandates a causal connection between 
the injury and the employment. Buczynski v. Industrial Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1169,1172 (UT 
App. 1997) (rejecting employee's contention under continuous coverage doctrine that slip 
and fall at hotel hot tub two days prior to giving her employment-related presentation was 
not applicable as employee was engaged in personal diversion at time of accident and her 
injury did not occur in the course of employment). 
In the case at bar, Alexander's performance of his marital duty of driving his wife 
about the valley to fulfill her employer's requirements, while admirable, demonstrates that 
his injuries did not arise while he was performing some employment-related task for his own 
employer. The fact that the radio was on and he may have been monitoring dispatch does not 
change the result, since the predominant motivation and purpose of his presence on the 
freeway was serving his own personal interest. See Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agency. Inc.. 
606 P.2d 256, 258 (UT 1980) (upholding Commission's denial of benefits for employee's 
11 
automobile accident injuries sustained during combined business-pleasure trip as the 
predominate purpose was for personal pleasure). In fact, Alexander testified that his only 
intent and purpose for being on the road at the time and place of the accident was to help his 
wife satisfy her employment obligations, then drive her to her office to report for work, and 
then drive to his duty station. (Tr. 181 at 73-74). There is no connection between the 
automobile accident in which Alexander was involved and his own job. He was not engaged 
in an employment-related risk that caused his injury. Rather he was engaged in the same risk 
to which his wife and thousands of civilian commuters were exposed during rush-hour 
traffic. The cause of his injuries was not his employment but his personal life. 
Salt Lake County's position is not unique. Although no Utah Court case has 
considered a closely-analogous fact situation, other states courts have fielded this issue.2 In 
Westberrv v. Town of Cape Elizabeth. 492 A.2d. 888 (Sup. Jud. Ct. of Maine 1985), the 
court denied benefits to an officer injured while driving home from work, even though he 
was wearing his police uniform, he was armed, and he was "technically on call twenty-four 
hours per day." (Id. at 889-890). The court concluded that the officer was not injured within 
the course of his employment even though he was on call twenty-four hours per day and he 
was injured on a street normally within his employer's jurisdiction. (Id. at 890-891). See 
also City of Louisville v. Brown. 707 S.W. 2d 346 (Ct. of App. Kentucky 1986) (reversing 
award to off-duty officer directing traffic at school as injury not incurred in pursuit of her 
2
 The county does not assert that this list has exhausted state law from other jurisdictions 
on this issue. 
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employment even though she was wearing her uniform and using a police vehicle with 
emergency lights running, and rejecting her contention that by directing traffic she was 
rendering a beneficial service to her department); and Lawson v. City of Kansas. 918 P.2d 
653 (Ct. App. Kansas 1996) (reversing award of benefits to officer injured in altercation at 
sports bar finding that officer's injuries arose out of his employment, but not in the course 
of his duties, and rejecting as irrelevant applicant's authority to act as a police officer even 
though applicant had warned his assailant that he was a police officer before being 
assaulted). In both of these cases, there were clear visual or oral indicia of the worker's law-
enforcement status when injured, yet the courts found insufficient connections to 
employment to trigger coverage. Alexander's case is even weaker. There was nothing in his 
personal appearance or in the appearance of his vehicle, and nothing in his activities, 
demonstrating to the public that he was anything more than another freeway commuter. 
In City of North Bay Village v. Millerick. 721 S.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), the 
court evaluated a case much closer to a finding of compensability than Alexander has 
presented in the case at bar. Millerick was a sergeant with the North Bay Village Police 
Department and went out to socialize and drink one evening after his shift had ended. 
During the evening he encountered a woman who had given him information leading to the 
arrest of a drug suspect. He spoke with her and neglected to tell her that the suspect had been 
arrested. She left, telling him that she was going to another bar, and he decided to locate her 
to give her this information. He visited other bars attempting to locate her and struck up a 
conversation with another suspect while visiting a known drug hangout. That suspect was 
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provoked by Millerick and who then struck Millerick and announced to the bar patrons that 
Millerick was a police officer. 
Millerick then left the bar and was challenged by two men, whom he thought were 
drug dealers, entered his vehicle which they attacked, and as he was driving away he crashed 
and was injured. (Id. at 1230-1231). The worker's compensation board awarded Millerick 
workman's compensation benefits because he had received his injuries while engaged in his 
primary duties as a police officer. (Id. at 1231). A Florida statute provided that a police 
officer discharging a primary law-enforcement responsibility "shall be deemed to have been 
acting in the course of his employment" regardless of the duty status at the time. (Id.). 
The Court of Appeals reversed the award, holding that the evidence Millerick was 
prepared to discharge his law enforcement duties was not enough to bring him within the 
ambit of the statute since his reasons for being out at the bars were primarily social. (Id. at 
1231-1232). The court relied on two cases in rejecting Milleiick's claims that his injuries 
arose in the course of his employment. In Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office v. Ginn, 570 
2.2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the court had held that a deputy sheriffs monitoring of his 
police radio and being on call did not render his off- duty injuries compensable as he was not 
engaged primarily in his law enforcement duties. In City of Ft Lauderdale v. Abrams, 561 
S.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the court rejected a forensic detective's automobile accident 
injury as being work related even though she possessed her crime scene investigation kit and 
a police radio at the time. (See Millerick, supra at 1231 for these discussions). See also 
Mayor & Alderman of the City of Savannah v. Stevens. 598 S.E. 2d. 456, 457 (Ga. 2004) 
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(officer in uniform and involved in automobile accident on way to work not entitled to 
compensation as injuries did not "arise out of employment" even though officer on call 
twenty-four hours per day and "expected to preserve the peace and enforce the law even 
when off duty," as injury did not arise from hazard inherent in police work); and Luna v. 
Worker's Compensation. 244 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. Div. 3 1988) (police officer 
injured in traffic accident on way to work intending to apprehend speeding suspect and 
preserve life and property not sufficient to show injury within work place setting). 
The record before this court provides an even thinner framework to support the 
compensation award. The record clearly shows that Alexander's intent and conduct were not 
even remotely employment related. When an injured worker's own testimony is that he was 
not on duty, he was engaged in personal errands, and he intended to continue those personal 
errands for the immediate future, and the Commission extends compensation, it is virtually 
impossible to contemplate a scenario where compensation would not be extended. 
Alexander's only connection to his employment at the time and place of his injury was his 
use of the sheriffs vehicle to run personal errands for himself and his wife. At the time and 
place of the accident, petitioner was not engaged in his police work, but he was engaged in 
the same activity-commuting to work or running errands-that tens of thousands of other 
drivers around him were engaged in at rush hour on 1-15. He has not demonstrated a 
compensable injury on the record. This court must reject the "police vehicle" exception to 
the automatic extension of coverage. The legislature has not extended discretion to the 
Commission to change the statutory language by interpretation. The Commission's ruling 
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in this case bears no reasonable or rational basis to Alexander's actions or his stated 
intentions at the time of his automobile accident. 
POINT II. THE "COMING-AND-GOING" RULE PRECLUDES A 
FINDING OF A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT, AS PETITIONER'S 
CONDUCT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN AN EXCEPTION, AND HE WAS 
ENGAGED IN PERSONAL ERRANDS AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY. 
Even if some causal connection can be made between Alexander's accident and his 
employment, his claim is still barred. While the "coming-and-going" rule is not statutorily 
created, it is recognized as inherent in analyzing whether an employee's injuries are so 
related to his employment that compensation must be extended. As outlined in A. Larson, 
Larson's Worker's Compensation, §13.01, at 13-2 (2000) (citations omitted): 
On the other hand, while admittedly the employment is the cause of the 
worker's journey between home and factory, it is generally taken for 
granted that workers' compensation was not intended to protect against 
all the perils of that journey. Between these two extremes, a compromise 
on the subject of going to and from work has been arrived at, largely by 
case law, with a surprising degree of unanimity: for an employee having 
fixed hours and place of work, going to and from work is covered only 
on the employer's premises. 
Under this analysis, employees on their way to or from work are not extended 
workman's compensation benefits when injured on such journeys. Utah has accepted this 
basic premise. See Higgins v. Industrial Comm'n. 700 P.2d 704, 707 (UT 1985). The fact 
that courts have recognized exceptions such as "special errand" or "special hazards" does not 
undermine the basic premise that employees injured while traveling to or from work have not 
suffered an industrial accident. The reasons underpinning this rule have been reaffirmed in 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 182-183 (UT 1985): 
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This general "coming and going" rule arose because, "in most instances, 
such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and hazards to which 
all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and 
hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the 
employer." 82 AmJr.2d Workers' Compensations § 296 (1992). 
The underlying theme of exceptions to the rule recognizes that the employee's injuries arose 
in the performance of a task for the employer, rather than in the performance of a personal 
errand. That is, the employee's injury-causing activity was benefitting the employer, rather 
than fulfilling the employee's personal desires, thereby triggering compensation. 
This theme was applied by the Supreme Court in Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co.. 801 P.2d 934,937 (UT 1989)3: 
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is unfair to 
impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees 
over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit. 
Therefore, the major focus in determining whether or not the general rule 
should apply in a given case is on the benefit the employer receives and 
his control over the conduct. 
Accord Cross v. Bd. of Review, 824 P.2d 202,1204 (UT App. 1992); VanLeewen. supra. 
Vanleeuwen is particularly instructive to the case at bar. There, the claimant was 
driving his employer-owned truck to work from his home. (901 P.2d at 283). He was a 
project supervisor, responsible for supervising other employees and transporting them to job 
sites. (Id.). The court rejected coverage, holding that the employee's arrival at work and his 
3See Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2002 UT 4, para 9, 73 P.3d 315, fact that 
employer receives some benefit or exercises some control over employee insufficient to remove 
employee from the "coming and going" rule. The County acknowledges that these cases 
involved third-party liability issues rather than worker's compensation coverages. The fact 
remains that there is no rational basis for reaching different results from the same facts depending 
upon which liability issue is under consideration. 
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use of the company vehicle did not provide substantial benefits to his employer so as to 
trigger coverage. (Id. at 285). The court found important that the employee was not 
performing any employment-related services at the time of his injuries and that "The risk that 
caused the accident was one common to the traveling public and was not created by duties 
connected with his employment." (Id.), (citation omitted). See also Black v. McDonald's 
ofLayton, 733 P.2d 154 (UT 1987) (no coverage for automobile accident when employees 
traveling to company-sponsored softball game injured in automobile accident). 
And in Drake, supra, the court refused compensation for an employee's injuries she 
sustained in an automobile accident after she had delivered documents for her employer, an 
errand she regularly performed after work two to three times per week. The court held that 
once she dropped off the documents and was en route to pick up her children, her claim was 
barred by the "coming-and-going" rule. (Id. at 184). The court extended no deference to the 
agency's analysis because the review involved the application of the law to the facts. (Id. 
at 181). 
At the time and place of this accident, Alexander was doing no more than 
contemplating driving to his duty station after he had completed his personal errands for his 
wife. He projected no law-enforcement presence on 1-15 through his attire, his civilian 
wife's presence in the vehicle, or his unmarked vehicle. He was not responding to any 
police-related call. He could not have responded to an in-progress crime or other emergency 
under the Sheriffs policy or from a practical point of view with his visually-impaired wife 
on board. He was not engaged in any general police work. He had no intent to engage in any 
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employment-related activity until he had completed his chores. He was too far away from 
his duty station to have gone on duty as scheduled. He was not being paid and he had no 
expectation of being paid for off-duty travel. The record is devoid of evidence that his 
presence at the time and place of the accident was benefitting the Sheriff. The Sheriff was 
not controlling Alexander's location, route of travel, or the performance of his personal 
errands at the time of the accident. Indeed his employer had no knowledge of Alexander's 
activities until he contacted dispatch after the accident had occurred. (Tr. 181 at 30). 
At the time and place of the accident, Alexander was neither performing his law 
enforcement duties nor engaging in activities so connected with his employment as to be an 
essential part thereof. See Barney v. Industrial Comm'n. 506 P.2d 1271 (UT 1973) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). The only connection to the County in this case was that 
Mr. and Mrs. Alexander occupied a County vehicle. Indeed, Mrs. Alexander suffered 
serious injuries in this accident. She sustained those injuries not from the risks of Mr. 
Alexander's work but from the same risks faced by all commuters that morning on 1-15. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislature accorded no discretion to the Commission to ignore the mandates of 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 that compensation may only be extended for injuries "arising 
out of an in the course of the employee's employment." With all due respect to the 
Commission, Salt Lake County respectfully submits that the compensation award must be 
reversed as it is "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record' and it is arbitrary and capricious. See UCA 63-46b-16 (4) (g) and (h) (1998). Accord 
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Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (UT 1993). 
The record reveals that at the time and place of his injury he was not engaged in 
police work or other service of benefit to the Sheriff. Alexander's primary activities and his 
intent for being where he was at the time and place of the accident were to take care of his 
spousal responsibilities, not to engage in law enforcement activities. In short, he was no 
different from the tens of thousands of civilian vehicles and their civilian occupants on 1-15 
that morning commuting to work or running their personal errands, and he was exposed to 
no risk greater than those commuters around him. 
There is no authority extended to the Commission to create a "police vehicle" 
exception to the "coming-and-going" rule. This court is not obligated to extend deference 
to the Commission's ruling on the application of law. Therefore, Salt Lake County requests 
that this court reverse the Commission's order awarding compensation and direct it to enter 
an order that Alexander's injuries are not industrially related and that his petition be 
dismissed. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached are the following: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1999). 
2. The ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated February 
22,2005. (R. at 83-91). 
3. The Appeals Board's Order Denying Review, dated February 13,2006. (R. at 
174-179). 
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§ 34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of an in 
the course of the employee's employment, whenever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and 
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter 
shall be: 
(a) on the employer an the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 calendar days after any 
final award by the commission. 
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The above-entitled matter was heard before Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge, 
Utah Labor Commission, on October 23,2003. The petitioner was represented by Brian Kelm, Esq. 
The respondent was represented by John Soltis, Esq. and T.J. Tsakalos, Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Steven A. Alexander, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor 
Commission on January 9, 2003, and claimed entitlement to medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and 
interest. The petitioner's claim for workers compensation benefits arose out of an alleged industrial 
accident that occurred on November 7, 2001. The respondent's denied that the accident on 
November 7, 2001, arose out of and in the course of the petitioner's employment. 
On April 16,2004, Judge Hann issued a Findings of Fact and Interim Order and referred the 
issue of medical causation to a Labor Commission medical panel. On August 12,2004, the medical 
panel issued a report. A copy of the medical panel's report was mailed to the parties. No party filed 
an objection to the report and it is admitted into the evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
601. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Employment. 
The petitioner was employed by the respondent as a deputy sheriff in the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office. On November 7, 2001, the petitioner's average weekly wage was $1,338.50. He 
was married with one dependent child. The petitioner's weekly workers compensation rate was 
$554.00 for temporary total compensation and $369.00 for permanent partial compensation. 
2. Respondent's Policy Regarding Sheriffs Office Vehicles. 
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The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office issued a written policy setting forth regulations 
governing vehicles issued to deputy sheriffs. Exhibit R-12. The policy stated in part that: 
Travel time will not be counted as time worked. This does not relieve a sworn 
employee from an obligation to check on the air or respond to a law enforcement 
situation. . . . 2-5-03.03(1 )(4). 
********** 
Office vehicles and equipment are issued to members for the use in the performance 
of their duties. It is the obligation of all members exercising control of these assets to 
safeguard them and use them within the limits of policy and good judgement. 2-8-
01.00. 
********* 
Deputy Sheriffs . . . assigned Sheriff's Office vehicles are subject to the following 
restrictions: 
(a) Vehicles will not be used for recreational or vacation trips. 
(e) Vehicles will not used for activities manifestly inconsistent with the obligation to 
respond to emergencies, such as heavy loads, objects protruding from windows 
or trunk, etc. 
(f) Vehicles may not be used for secondary employment purposes, except as 
transportation to and from the work site, except as otherwise authorized by Sheriff's 
Office policy. 2-8-02-04(2). 
********** 
Deputies will carry the following equipment with them in the vehicle at all times: 
(a) an authorized firearm. 
(b) Sheriff's Office identification. 
(c) a flashlight 
(d) a Utility Uniform 
(e) a citation book and 
(f) flares. 
2-8-02.04(4). 
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********** 
When off-duty, deputies may dress appropriate for their activities. If such dress is 
inappropriate to represent the Office in an emergency response, the Utility 
Uniform will be worn. 2-8-04(5). 
********** 
When using Sheriff's Office vehicles off-duty, deputies will keep the police radio 
on and monitor radio traffic. If in the vicinity of an in-progress crime or other 
emergency, the deputy will respond. The deputy will notify Dispatch of such 
response. Such responses will be made without non-peace officer passengers. 
2-8-02.04(6). 
********** 
Members are required to wear the seat belt correctly, position themselves 
approximately 12 inches back from the steering wheel, and keep hands to the 
sides of the steering wheel at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions. 2-8-
02.05(2)(a). 
According to the uncontradicted evidence, the respondent's policy allowed a deputy sheriff to 
use the assigned sheriff's vehicle for personal use. The respondent's policy required the deputy 
sheriff to monitor the police radio and to respond to police calls, and other situations that required 
law enforcement assistance, when operating the vehicle whether or not the deputy sheriff was 
officially on duty. The policy required the deputy sheriff to comply with specific safe driving 
techniques and vehicle equipment protocol. 
3. November 7, 2001, Accident. 
The undisputed facts concerning the motor vehicle accident on November 7,2001, were that 
the petitioner and his wife were northbound on 1-15 and 12300 South, in Salt Lake County, in a 
sheriffs vehicle issued to the petitioner by the respondent. Earlier that day, the petitioner had driven 
his wife to a medical appointment and he was driving her to work in Salt Lake City. The petitioner 
intended to drive to his workplace after dropping his wife off at her work. On route to Salt Lake City, 
on 1-15, the petitioner stopped his vehicle due to slow traffic. The petitioner observed the driver 
behind him would not be able to stop in time to avoid colliding with the rear end of his sheriff's 
vehicle. The petitioner removed his right hand from the steering wheel and placed it in front of his 
wife so that she would not hit the dashboard. The petitioner maintained his left hand on the steering 
wheel and he braced himself. Following the impact, the petitioner's wife was unconscious and non-
responsive. The petitioner called for an ambulance on the sheriff's vehicle's radio. 
On November 7, 2001, the sheriff's vehicle assigned to the petitioner was equipped with a 
police radio that turned on automatically when the ignition was started. The petitioner selected the 
radio frequency for the area in which he was driving, south Salt Lake County, and he monitored the 
radio traffic. The petitioner transported in the vehicle a loaded M-16 rifle, 12 gauge shot gun and 
side arm. The petitioner was dressed in his work clothes (the petitioner was not a uniformed deputy) 
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and he had his sheriff's office jacket and badge. The sheriff's vehicle was unmarked, it had a siren 
and forward and back deck lights. 
4. Petitioner's Preexisting Right Shoulder Injury. 
The petitioner received treatment for right shoulder pain and decreased range of motion prior 
to the November 1,2001, motor vehicle accident. On December 21,2000, Dr. Charles Beck noted 
the petitioner complained of a deep ache in his shoulder with radiation into his thumb that began 
when he was exercising two months earlier and he felt a pop in his shoulder. X-rays of the 
petitioner's shoulder revealed a type III acromion with a five to eight mm hook and spurring of the 
glenohumeral space but no significant narrowing with osteoarthritic changes of the AC joint. The 
petitioner was given an injection. He had rapid improvement of his shoulder to near normal strength 
and motion and he was assigned a rotator cuff strengthening program. Medical exhibit 308. 
On February 6, 2001, the petitioner reported shoulder improvement but he complained of 
pain. The petitioner reported that, at times, the physical therapy increased his symptoms. Dr. Beck 
reported the petitioner had an improved range of motion although his impression was a probable 
rotator cuff tear. Dr. Beck noted the petitioner could not have a MRI scan because of a steel 
fragment in his eye. Dr. Beck recommended the petitioner have shoulder therapy but he deferred it 
as his wife was recovering from knee surgery. Dr. Beck recommended the petitioner continue his 
home exercise program and seek follow up medical treatment if his symptoms worsened. Medical 
exhibit 310. 
5. Petitioner's Injury Sustained in November 1, 2001, Accident. 
The petitioner's right shoulder began to hurt after the collision. Following the motor vehicle 
accident, the petitioner's wife had stroke like symptoms caused by a tear in her brain stem. The 
petitioner's wife underwent considerable medical treatment. During this period, the petitioner did not 
seek medical attention for his shoulder as he was busy caring for his wife and assisting in her 
medical treatment. The petitioner timely reported the motor vehicle accident to the respondent and 
his sore shoulder. 
On March 5, 2002, the petitioner received medical treatment from Dr. Beck for continued 
pain in his right shoulder. Dr. Beck noted the petitioner's shoulder was weak and had a guarded 
range of motion. The petitioner underwent surgery the next day, March 6, 2002. Medical exhibit 
310. The petitioner's post-operative diagnosis was a right rotator cuff tear and adhesive capsulitis. 
The indications for the petitioner's surgery included an injury to his shoulder several months earlier 
while doing bar dips with decreased strength and range of motion and pain. Medical exhibit 312. 
On March 12, 2002, Dr. Beck opined the petitioner's symptoms worsened after the motor 
vehicle accident in November 2001. Dr. Beck further opined, although the petitioner's shoulder 
condition had improved with the steroid injection, the car accident "...apparently kicked off adhesive 
capsulitis and partially tore his rotator cuff, resulting in the present surgery. Prior to that the 
petitioner had only mild to moderate symptoms from impingement...." Medical exhibit 310. 
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Dr. Beck released the petitioner to light duty on July 23, 2002, and he determined that the 
petitioner was medically stable on February 11,2003. Medical exhibit 321 and 329. On June 30, 
2003, Dr. Beck assigned to the petitioner's right shoulder a four percent whole person impairment 
rating. Dr. Beck apportioned 50% of the petitioner's impairment to his pre-existing condition, or two 
percent whole person, and two percent whole person due to the November 2001, motor vehicle 
accident. Medical exhibit 331. 
In a September 17, 2002, letter to Salt Lake County Risk Management, Dr. Beck noted the 
petitioner's right shoulder symptoms significantly worsened following the November 2001, motor 
vehicle accident. He opined that at least 50% of the petitioner's right shoulder condition was the 
result of the accident. Medical exhibit 325-326. 
On September 22,2003, Dr. Richard Knoebel conducted an independent medical evaluation 
of the petitioner. Dr. Knoebel opined the petitioner's November 7,2001, motor vehicle accident was 
not the cause of his right shoulder condition. Dr. Knoebel based his opinion, in part, on the 
petitioner's delay in seeking medical treatment following the accident. Dr. Knoebel assigned to the 
petitioner's right shoulder a five percent upper extremity impairment rating. Medical exhibit 358-370. 
On October 14,2003, Dr. Ronald Ruff performed a review of the petitioner's medical records 
for the respondent. Dr. Ruff noted that "...it is impossible to say that these shoulder problems were 
not exacerbated by the accidents." Medical exhibit 356. 
On June 2, 2004, the Labor Commission medical panel opined that, in terms of 
reasonable medical probability, there was a medically demonstrable causal connection between 
the petitioner's right shoulder condition and the motor vehicle accident on November 7, 2001. 
The medical panel further opined the treatment the petitioner received for his right shoulder 
condition since November 7, 2001, was reasonable and necessary to treat his injury due to the 
motor vehicle accident. The medical panel assessed to the petitioner's right shoulder condition 
a five percent permanent physical impairment rating. It apportioned two percent whole person, 
of the impairment rating, to the petitioner's pre-existing condition and three percent whole person 
to the November 7, 2001, motor vehicle accident. The medical panel concluded that the 
petitioner was not malingering and he had a normal mental status. 
6. Temporary Total Compensation. 
It is undisputed that the petitioner missed work due to his right shoulder condition. The 
petitioner had right shoulder surgery on March 6, 2002, and he returned to work on August 6, 
2002. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The November 7, 2001, Accident and Scope of Employment 
Section 34A-2-401(1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that an employee 
who is injured by accident "arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment... shall 
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be paid compensation." Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course of. 
. . employment." Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). 
In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals cited the Utah 
Supreme Court and held: 
The major premise of the going and coming rule is that it is unfair to impose 
unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has not 
control and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in 
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on the 
benefit the employer receives and his control over the conduct. 
In the present case, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates the respondent's 
policy imposed substantial control and obligation on the petitioner both on and off duty. Although 
the policy allowed the petitioner to use his assigned sheriff's vehicle when off-duty, he could not use 
it for recreational or vacation trips or secondary employment, other than to and from the work site. 
The policy required the petitioner to monitor the police radio when operating the vehicle and respond 
to a law enforcement situation even if he was not on duty. On the day of the motor vehicle accident, 
the petitioner was dressed for work and he carried the mandated sheriff's equipment in the vehicle. 
The petitioner operated the vehicle as the policy proscribed including monitoring the sheriff's radio in 
the areas he traveled. Finally, the petitioner provided a visual law enforcement presence in the local 
community. The sheriff's vehicle was an instrumentality of the Sheriff's Office at all hours of the day 
and night when the petitioner operated it. Thus, the petitioner was performing for his employer a 
substantial sen/ice required by the respondent's policy. 
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment. The benefit the petitioner provided to the respondent was substantial both on and 
off duty when he operated his assigned sheriff's vehicle. Furthermore, the respondent had 
substantial control in the manner in which the petitioner operated the sheriffs vehicle both on and off 
duty. 
2. Medical Causation of Petitioner's Right Shoulder Condition. 
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the petitioner sustained a preexisting 
injury to his right shoulder in fall 2000, for which he received medical treatment. Therefore, the 
petitioner is held to a higher legal standard under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that on November 7,2001, the petitioner 
was involved in a severe industrial accident when sheriff's vehicle that he was driving was rear 
ended on a freeway. A medical demonstrable causal connection existed between the petitioner's 
right shoulder condition and the industrial accident on November 7, 2001. The medical treatment 
the petitioner received for his right shoulder condition since November 7,2001, was reasonable and 
necessary to treat his right shoulder condition due to the industrial accident. 
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Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an injury that was caused by an industrial 
accident on November 7, 2001. 
3. Temporary Total Compensation. 
The petitioner missed a total of 21.6 weeks of work due to the industrial injury he sustained 
on November 7, 2001. 
4. Permanent Partial Compensation. 
The preponderance of the evidence, based on an impartial medical panel, demonstrates that 
the petitioner suffered a five percent whole person physical impairment of his right shoulder. Two 
percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's pre-existing 
condition. Three percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's 
industrial accident. 
5. Travel Expenses. 
The petitioner provided no evidence concerning his travel expenses associated with the 
medical treatment for his industrially caused injuries. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner temporary total 
compensation at the rate of $554.00 per week for 21.6 weeks, for a total of $11,966.40, less 
attorney's fees to Brian Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410. That amount is accrued, 
due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner permanent partial 
compensation for a three percent impairment rating at the rate of $369.00 per week, for 9.36 weeks, 
for a total of $3,453.84, less attorney's fees to Mr. Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412. 
That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay all medical expenses reasonably 
related to the petitioner's industrial accident of November 7, 2001, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any 
travel allowances hereinafter incurred, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah 
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-13. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay the statutory attorneys' fees of 
$3,084.05, plus twenty percent (20%) of the interest awarded herein, directly to Mr. Kelm pursuant to 
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Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That amount shall be 
deducted from the petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Mr. Kelm. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner's claim for travel expenses is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED THIS 22nd day of February 2005. 
UTAH LABOR COI^SS ION 
LORRlM/ IA w 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on February 21,2005, to the persons/parties at 
the following addresses: 
Brian Kelm Esq 
350 S 400 E Ste 122-W 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
John P. Soltis 
2001 So State St Suites S 3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
T J Tsakalos 
2001 So State St Suites S 3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
UJAHXABOR COMMISSION 
Clerk, Adjudication Division 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
STEVEN A. ALEXANDER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 03-0089 
Salt Lake County asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review 
Administrative Law Judge Lima's award of benefits to Steven A. Alexander under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
On January 9, 2003, Mr. Alexander filed an application to compel Salt Lake County to pay 
workers' compensation benefits for injuries Mr. Alexander suffered in a traffic accident on 
November 7,2001. Judge Hann held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Alexander's claim on October 
23, 2003, and referred the medical aspects of the claim to a medical panel. Judge Hann then 
resigned from the Commission and Judge Lima assumed responsibility in this matter. On February 
22, 2005, after receiving the medical panel's report, Judge Lima issued her decision awarding 
benefits to Mr. Alexander. 
In its request for review of Judge Lima's decision, Salt Lake County argues that Mr. 
Alexander is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because his injuries did not arise out of 
and in the course of his employment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
At the time of his accident, Mr. Alexander was a lieutenant in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office, where he supervised the Detectives Division. He was oncall day and night, seven days a 
week, for investigation of homicides and other major crimes. Even when offduty, he was required to 
respond to calls, as well as responding to crimes committed in his presence. 
-rv *-x s v~-i A 
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Salt Lake County has adopted a policy under which police vehicles were issued to Mr. 
Alexander and other law enforcement officers "for use in the performance of their duties." The 
County's policy allowed officers to use their County-owned vehicles for personal travel, subject to 
some restrictions discussed below. The County provided all fuel, maintenance and repair for the 
vehicles. In return, the County benefited from increased numbers of officers on the streets, faster 
response and, in general, increased police availability. There are circumstances when the county 
would have benefited from having an unmarked car on the road. 
The County controlled officers' use of the County's vehicles in several ways. Officers 
were required to: 1) monitor the police radios in their vehicles and respond to law enforcement 
situations, whether on-duty or off-duty; 2) keep their cars clean, orderly and properly maintained; 3) 
carry firearms, police identification, a uniform, flashlight, citation book, and flares in the vehicle at 
all times. Officers were prohibited from: 1) using their vehicles for recreational or vacation trips; 2) 
driving their vehicles outside Salt Lake County without prior authorization; 3) using their vehicle if 
the officer or any passengers had consumed any alcohol within the previous six hours; 4) 
transporting alcohol, except for official business; 5) using the vehicle for any activities inconsistent 
with the officer's obligation to respond to emergencies; 6) allowing anyone other than a Sheriffs 
Office member to operate the vehicle; 7) dressing "in any way that could bring discredit to the 
Sheriffs office, i.e. tank tops, reversed ball caps, earrings, day old beards, etc." Off-duty officers 
were permitted to have civilian passengers with them but they were not permitted to respond to 
police calls with such passengers in the car. 
Mr. Alexander had actually used his County-owned vehicle several times during off-duty 
hours to engage in law enforcement activities such as traffic stops and officer back-up. 
The accident that gives rise to Mr. Alexander current workers' compensation claim 
occurred as he and his wife were traveling to work in the County-owned police vehicle assigned to 
Mr. Alexander. Mr. Alexander intended to drop his wife at her place of employment and then drive 
to his own work locatoin. The vehicle in question had no external markings as a police vehicle, but 
was, nevertheless, fully equipped as a police car, with siren, radio and internal police lights. Mr. 
Alexander was operating the vehicle in compliance with all County requirements and restrictions. 
As a result of the accident, Mr. Alexander suffered the shoulder injuries for which he now seeks 
workers' compensation benefits. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides medical and 
disability benefits to employees injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment." The question presented in this case is whether Mr. Alexander's injury, which 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
STEVEN A. ALEXANDER 
PAGE 3 
occurred as he and his wife were driving to work in a County-owned police car, arose out of and in 
the course of his employment. Salt Lake County argues that, under the "coming and going" rule, 
Mr. Alexander's injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his work and are not compensable 
under the workers' compensation system. 
As noted above, injuries are only compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act when 
they arise out of and in the course of employment. Whether an injury is work-related, and therefore 
compensable, depends on the specific facts of each case. As a general rule, injuries sustained while 
"coming and going" to work are not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment and 
are not compensable. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281,284 (Utah App. 1995). 
However, this "coming and going" rule is not absolute. Among its exceptions are situations where 
the employer provides transportation primarily for the employer's own benefit and exercises control 
over the use of that transportation. VanLeeuwen at 285. Consequently, in order for the Appeals 
Board to determine whether Mr. Alexander's claim is barred by the "coming and going" rule, it is 
necessary to consider the degree to which Mr. Alexander's travel was for the County's benefit and 
under the County's control. 
In evaluating the benefits Salt Lake County received from Mr. Alexander's travel in his 
County-owned police car, the Appeals Board notes that such travel was pursuant to a policy 
established by the County itself. It is undisputed that the County received substantial benefit from 
the policy as a result of greater law enforcement coverage throughout the County. Furthermore, the 
County exercised substantial control over vehicle use. Among other things, the officers were 
required to cany firearms, I.D. and a uniform, and other equipment. They were required to monitor 
and respond to calls and to engage in police action when feasible. All these obligations and 
restrictions applied to Mr. Alexander at the time of his accident. 
The Appeals Board also notes Salt Lake County's argument that, because Mr. Alexander's 
wife was in his County-owned vehicle at the time of the accident, he was precluded from taking 
police action and can not be considered in the course of his employment. However, the County's 
written policy explicitly permits law enforcement officers to transport passengers, subject only to the 
restriction that such passengers cannot be in the car when the officer responds to a law enforcement 
situation. The County presented no other evidence on this point, and the Appeals Board cannot 
presume that Mrs. Alexander's presence necessarily precluded Mr. Alexander from engaging in law 
enforcement action. 
While the Appeals Board recognizes that Mr. Alexander also received a substantial personal 
benefit from his ability to use a County vehicle for personal use,' the Appeals Board finds that based 
on the evidence presented, the County received the predominant benefit from his travel. 
Consequently, Mr. Alexander's traffic accident and injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment and is compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board denies Salt Lake County's motion for review and affirms Judge Lima's 
decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this 13 day of February, 2006. 
Dissenting Opinion follows on next page 
l Joseph E. Hatch having recused himself from consideration of this case, Thomas Lewis has been 
desgnated to participate as a member of the Appeals Board pursuant to § 34A-1-303(5) of the Utah 
Labor Commission Act. 
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DISSENT 
I respectfully dissent from the Appeals Board's majority decision. In VanLeeuwen v. 
Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281,284 (Utah App. 1995), the decision turned on which party, the 
employer or the employee, received the predominant benefit from the travel. In my view, the 
realities of Mr. Alexander's use of his police vehicle for personal errands and commuting to and 
from work establish that he, rather than the County, received the primary benefit. That he was 
spared the expense of coming and going to work was a major benefit to him. In contrast, it is 
difficult to discern any significant benefit that the County was receiving from Mr. Alexander's off-
duty travel at the time of his accident. This is particularly true in light of the facts that: a) because of 
the administrative nature of his work, he was not in uniform; b) he was driving an unmarked car, 
rather than a marked police car; c) he had a civilian (his wife) with him; and d) he was not engaged 
in any work-related activity, but was driving his wife to her place of employment. Pursuant to § 2-8-
02.04(6) of Salt Lake County's written policy governing vehicle use, the presence of Mr. 
Alexander's wife in Mr. Alexander's vehicle precluded Mr. Alexander from responding to any law 
enforcement situation. 
"Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be 'in the course of . . . 
employment.'" Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P. 2d 1165,1166 (Utah 1985). At the time of 
his accident, Mr. Alexander was performing no services for the County. His work responsibilities 
neither caused nor contributed to the accident. I see no significant difference between his 
circumstances and the circumstances of thousands of other Utah commuters who, under the coming 
and going rule, would be denied workers' compensation benefits if they were involved in such an 
accident. 
Because Mr. Alexander received the predominate benefit from his off-duty use of his patrol 
vehicle, I would hold that he is subject to the coming and going rule, and that his accident and 
injuries are not compensable under the workers' compensation system. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Steven A. Alexander, Case No. 03-0089, was mailed first class postage prepaid this /3 day of 
February, 2006, to the following: 
Steven A. Alexander 
6025 N 5000 W 
Delta UT 84624 
Salt Lake County 
Workers' Comp. Claims 
2001 S State St Ste 3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
Brian Kelm, Esq. 
350S400EStel22-W 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
T.J. Tsakalos, Esq. 
2001 S State St Ste S3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
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Sara Danielson 
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